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The law of actions is the last of the three subjects in the institutional scheme, and is quite 
different from the subjects that precede it. While the earlier subjects are concerned with 
substantive rules, the law of actions is concerned with redress. It is not quite the same as 
‘the law of procedure’, however; it often includes matters that might easily have been 
treated under the law of persons or of things. This is because actions evolved as a subject 
over a time when procedure was not distinct from substantive law.  
I. ‘Action’ (J.4.6 pr; 4.15)  
The word ‘action’ is awkward to define, not because its meaning is hard to understand 
from any one example, but because it appears in many different contexts and therefore 
evades any one definition. In Latin the word is actio, from the verb agere, which for our 
purposes is best translated broadly: ‘to urge’. Generally, to have an action means that a 
person is entitled to pursue a remedy for some injustice done to him. If, for example, a 
person has been a victim of fraud, he might be allowed an actio de dolo, an ‘action for 
fraud’. This would entitle him to go before a judge and to urge the judge to give him 
relief.  
From this example it might seem that an action is in fact a ‘right’, and that when we 
say a person is entitled to pursue a remedy we are saying that he has a right to relief. But 
to equate an action with a right is to substitute a concept that we appreciate easily, but 
that the Romans came to appreciate only over time. We have no difficulty in 
understanding that a person under certain circumstances has a right (for example, when 
he is injured), that that right has an existence in the abstract, and that it is the function of 
the judicial machinery – the judges, tribunals, rules of procedure and evidence – to 
transform that right into a remedy. But in a system where the substantive law often 
speaks in the language of procedure (‘If it appears that X ought to give 10 to Y, the judge 
shall condemn for 10’), and where procedure is not seen as something necessarily 
separate from the rest of the law, this sort of abstraction does not come easily.
1
 Under 
such a system, someone who has suffered a wrong will probably see himself, not as a 
person with some abstract entitlement to be made whole, but as a person who is entitled 
to clear a procedural hurdle. This is made very plain <209> in the classical definition of 
actio (Celsus, D.44.7.51) which Justinian uses at J.4.6 pr, a definition that has certain 
shortcomings but otherwise conveys well the limited notion of an action: ‘An action is 
nothing but a right to go to court to get one’s due.’
2
 This statement shows clearly that an 
action, if it is a right at all, is more a right to proceed than a right to prevail, and that any 
definition of ‘action’ ought to put process at the fore. Accordingly, actio is often 
translated as ‘claim’ or (circuitously) as ‘right of action’, to show that a person, on 
presenting certain facts, will be allowed to follow a certain procedural agenda appropriate 
to those facts. That person hopes, but is not assured, that this agenda will culminate in the 
granting of relief. In English the word ‘warrant’ also has something of actio in this sense.  
[Note: in the original work, endnotes commence on page <227>]  
1
  See generally P. Stein, Legal Institutions: The Development of Dispute Settlement (London, 1984) 
pp. 128-9; H.F. Jolowicz, Roman Foundations of Modern Law (Oxford, 1957) pp. 66-81.  
2
  The flaw in the definition is that ‘one’s due’ (quod sibi debetur) seems to exclude 
real actions.  
For our purposes it is satisfactory to define an action as a claim or a warrant. At the 
same time it is worth mentioning that actio appears in contexts in which the meaning is 
either more broad or more refined, and where ‘claim’ or ‘warrant’ will not work.  
(1) To describe an action as a claim or warrant gives the impression that an action 
requires the intervention of the state. Yet the word actio may describe a purely private 
event, as for example in D.48.1.7 (Macer), where actio is used to describe simply the act 
of a person, an act which (in this context) brings disgrace upon that person if it becomes 
the subject of certain proceedings. An important example of actio as a private event is 
self-help. An actio may describe not only the pursuit of a remedy with the sanction of the 
state, but also the act of an individual privately vindicating a wrong done to him. In the 
earlier forms of Roman procedure, for example, there existed actions for seizing a person 
or his property – the legis actio per manus iniectionem and legis actio per pignoris 
capionem (G.4.21 – 29) – that a person might resort to without prior litigation.  
Self-help is not a particularly significant institution in the developed law of actions, 
but is nevertheless important for illustrating the essence of the word ‘action’. Roman law 
did not draw a firm line between a person’s real and formal claim, that is, between the 
claim a person possesses simply by virtue of being wronged, and the claim recognised by 
a court.
3
 Thus a person might possess a claim for redress even if the judicial machinery 
had not yet granted it to him.  
(2) In their treatments of actions, both Gaius and Justinian discuss a great deal more 
than simply ‘claims’, and for this reason we often understand the idea of ‘actions’ quite 
broadly. Gaius, for example, devotes a fair amount of space to procedure, and even 
discusses a form of procedure that was all but unused in his own time. Justinian, though 
he does not speak directly about the earlier forms of procedure (which were obsolete by 
his time), does speak about more general matters of litigation, for example, pleading, 
interdicts, and judges. And in our other sources we find definitions of ‘actio’ that are very 
broad (see e.g. Ulpian, D.44.7.37), generally encompassing the various ways of 
presenting issues to a tribunal. For <210> these reasons ‘actions’ is sometimes treated as 
synonymous with ‘procedure’ or ‘remedies’.  
3
  H. Honsell, T. Mayer-Maly and W. Selb, Römisches Recht 4th ed. (Berlin, 1987) p. 218 n.2.  
The two instances of actio just discussed – ‘private act’ and ‘procedure’ – are cited in 
order to show that ‘action’ may sometimes mean something more general than ‘claim’. In 
other contexts it is used in exactly the opposite way, to indicate not simply a claim, but a 
particular kind of claim:  
(3) An action is sometimes distinguished from an interdict. ‘Interdict’ describes 
several decrees issued by magistrates and often used to confer or protect possession. They 
were highly procedural in character; it would be difficult to discuss the ‘substantive law 
of interdicts’, because an interdict was a specific order granted on the presentation of 
specific facts. What distinguishes an interdict from an action (as described here) is 
principally the fact that an interdict, in form, is virtually a remedy in itself. The 
magistrate does not, as in an ordinary action, summarise the dispute and pass it on to 
someone else for resolution, but instead issues a decree himself. The decree, it is true, 
might not be the end of the matter, instead often requiring the resolution of a judge, or 
serving as a predicate for a subsequent action. But the interdict alone, as a decree issued 
directly by the magistrate, was administrative in character, and was therefore 
distinguishable from an action.  
Justinian offers several different ways to classify interdicts (J.4.15); the possessory 
interdicts and their three divisions are worth mentioning briefly. These interdicts have in 
common the feature that each culminates in the grant of possession in favour of a party. 
The first possessory interdict is for obtaining possession, and Justinian’s example is an 
interdict that arises in the context of succession law (J.4.15.3). This interdict existed as a 
part of the praetor’s efforts to alter the scheme of succession under the state law with a 
scheme (bonorum possessio) based to a greater extent on blood relationship (see Chapter 
4, section III(c) above). A person favoured by the praetor’s innovations who wished to 
obtain possession of the tangible assets of the estate could request from the praetor an 
‘interdict quorum bonorum’. The interdict took the form of an order to the person in 
possession – in this case a person without title or who claimed to possess as heir – 
directing that person to restore the property to the other. Even though the interdict 
determined the question of possession and nothing else, this would often be the end of the 
dispute: efforts to establish ownership of the property against the new possessor (if the 
grant of bonorum possessio were of a certain character) would be fruitless.  
The situation was different under the second division of the possessory interdicts, 
those for retaining possession. Here the interdicts often served only as a procedural step 
in advance of a proper action for ownership, and not as a final remedy. In other words, 
these interdicts were very much part of a pretrial tactic, made necessary by the 
characteristics of the ownership action.  
In a perfect system of litigation, we would expect a tribunal to listen <211> equally to 
competing claims for ownership and give judgment in favour of the better claim. But in 
the Roman system, as in modern systems, a plaintiff carries the burden of proof, and 
proving ownership is not an easy matter, particularly where no system of public 
registration exists. This means that if a person had the freedom to do so he would choose 
to be a defendant and not a plaintiff, leaving it to his opponent to prove ownership. The 
possessory interdicts, to a certain extent, allowed such a choice: if a party could put 
himself in possession of the disputed property, it was then left to his opponent to bring 
suit and try to establish ownership. Thus the battle for ownership might be preceded by a 
battle for possession (J.4.15.4).  
In the case of immoveables, the battle for possession might begin with the 
pronouncement of an interdict uti possidetis. This would consist of a decree addressed to 
both parties, stating that force could not be used to dispossess whichever of the parties 
was innocently in possession of the property. After a complex course of proceedings, the 
party with the better claim under the words of the interdict would be awarded possession. 
This would put him in the more enviable position of defending rather than establishing 
ownership, if his opponent sought to claim ownership in a further proceeding. In 
Justinian’s time the interdict utrubi, applying to moveables, operated in the same way, 
although in the classical law the phrasing of the interdict was slightly different; it allowed 
an innocent possessor not only to retain possession, but to recover possession that was 
recently lost (J.4.15.4a).  
The third kind of possessory interdict is for recovering possession. The Institutes 
gives the example of a person dispossessed of immoveable property by force (J.4.15.6). 
The interdict described there – the interdict unde vi – existed as two different interdicts in 
the classical law but was made uniform by Justinian’s time. The classical interdict unde 
vi was an order to restore immoveable property to an innocent possessor who had been 
evicted by force within the previous year. The classical interdict unde vi armata was 
directed against one who had dispossessed not only by force, but by armed men as well, 
and given the gravity of the act it was unnecessary to show that the dispossessed person 
had come by his possession innocently. In Justinian’s synthesis of these two interdicts, 
violent dispossession was enough disliked that an ejector could no longer challenge the 
innocence of the ejectee’s possession in any event.  
The taxonomy that distinguishes an action from an interdict is far from perfect. In the 
Institutes Justinian (borrowing from Gaius) first says that ‘All our law is about persons, 
things, or actions’ (J.1.2.12), and later says ‘We look next at interdicts or the actions used 
instead of them’ (J.4.15 pr). It is important not to worry too much over this sort of 
inconsistency, but simply to recognise the basic difference between an action (a claim) 
and an interdict (an administrative remedy).  
(4) There are other so-called ‘praetorian remedies’ that are often distin- <212> 
guished from actions. Like interdicts, these remedies were issued by the praetor himself, 
sometimes after a short inquiry, and sometimes after hearing only one party. There were 
various forms. For example, the praetor sometimes circumvented the law and restored 
parties to their previous positions, put a party in possession of the other party’s property 
as security, or exacted a promise from one party in favour of the other. Some of these 
remedies appear sporadically in the Institutes.
4
  
(5) The three words actio petitio persecutio appear together in some contexts and are 
understood to refer to specific types of suits. In this narrow sense an actio refers to a 
personal action, petitio refers to a real action, and persecutio refers to a restorative action 
(according to Papinian, D.44.7.28), or to an extraordinary proceeding (according to 
Ulpian, D.50.16.178.2). The most familiar occurrence of these three words is in the so-
called Aquilian stipulation, described at J.3.29.2 (see Chapter 5, section IX above). They 
also appear in some legislation (see the lex Coloniae Genetivae Iuliae, chapters 125-132, 
passim).  
II. The Formulary Procedure  
From the 2nd century BC until the 3rd century AD, most Roman litigation was conducted 
according to what is called the ‘formulary procedure’. The subject is omitted from the 
Institutes but discussed at length by Gaius. It is difficult to give any account of actions 
without at least a sketch of the formulary procedure; the subject of actions owes a great 
deal to its influence. Of course ‘claims’ existed long before it was created and continued 
to exist long after it was abolished. But actions as Gaius and Justinian present them are 
not simply lists of claims. They are claims that are classified with great acuteness and 
expressed with great technical precision. Their classifications are due partly to the 
formulary procedure, and their expression is due almost entirely to it.  
4
  See P.G. Stein, ‘“Equitable” Remedies for the Protection of Property’, in P. <228> Birks (ed), New 
Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property (Oxford, 1989) pp. 185-94.  
Roman litigation was conducted in two phases. The first phase was public, conducted 
before a magistrate of the state, the praetor or aedile, charged with administering justice. 
The second phase was private, conducted before a judge, a private individual who need 
not have been a lawyer. The public phase was very brief; the magistrate would simply 
determine whether the litigants should be allowed to proceed and, if so, what form their 
action should take. The private phase was the trial itself.  
The magistrate needed a scheme for determining which claims would be allowed to 
go forward. His duties would have become impossible if he had had to consult treatises 
and legislation and make a fresh decision on the suitability of every claim. Accordingly 
he maintained and put on display a long list announcing his intentions and expectations 
regarding the lawsuits he would allow. This list, the edict, contained individual entries 
describing the actions which he was willing to grant. If a litigant came before him and 
requested one of the actions, the magistrate would ordinar- <213> ily grant it (though he 
might deny under certain circumstances, for example on account of res judicata). If the 
litigant’s circumstances did not match any of the entries, he might persuade the 
magistrate to invent a new claim and allow it to go before a judge. If the magistrate saw 
fit, he might even incorporate the new claim in the edict for future cases.  
The passing of the suit from the magistrate to the judge was an act that required great 
care. The principal problem was the judge’s peculiar standing within the legal system. 
The judge did not hold office, but was appointed for service in a single case, and selected 
personally by the parties if possible. He had no special qualifications other than his 
wealth. He was simply a private individual who conducted the trial without even 
intermittent guidance from the state. The consequences were (1) he required detailed 
written instructions at the outset, and (2) what he did with those instructions – his conduct 
of the trial, his judgment – was of no enduring importance whatsoever to the legal 
system.  
This meant that the final, formal act of the state, the final expression of the law in a 
given case, was the set of instructions that the magistrate gave to the judge. These 
instructions, from one perspective, were the parties’ pleadings, as they contained their 
allegations, the matters they hoped to prove. But because the allegations had to satisfy the 
requirements of the law as determined by the magistrate, they came into the judge’s 
hands in a technical form, a form that permitted relief under the law. This makes the 
instructions the single most important item in the lawsuit, far more important than the 
judgment. A judgment declaring who won or lost could have little value compared to 
these instructions which, under this public/private system of litigation, necessarily recited 
for the judge’s benefit the kernel of the dispute: what a party had to show in order to win.  
The instructions were prepared according to formulae, composed of ‘specially 
prepared phrases’ (G.4.30). Each formula was divided into parts, and each part had a 
particular function. Very few actual formulae survive; one of the few that does survive is 
below. It was found near Pompeii and dates from the first century AD:
5
  
C. Blossius Celadus shall be the judge. If it appears that C. Marcius Saturninus ought to 
give 18,000 sesterces to C. Sulpicius Cinnamus, which is the matter in dispute, C. 
Blossius Celadus, the judge, shall condemn C. Marcius Saturninus for 18,000 sesterces in 
favour of C. Sulpicius Cinnamus; otherwise he shall absolve.  
This formula describes an action called a condictio certae pecuniae, a personal claim for 
a particular sum of money. It was the appropriate action in cases where, among other 
things, a person had given a stipulation to pay money to another. We are able to classify 
formulae in this way and pair certain formulae with certain actions because each different 
formulae was <214> drafted with a significant form of words. One part of the formula, 
the intentio (or ‘principal pleading’), is particularly revealing in this respect. The intentio 
in the formula above is the phrase ‘If it appears that C. Marcius Saturninus ought to give 
18,000 sesterces to C. Sulpicius Cinnamus ….’ The word ‘if’ tells us the claim is for a 
certain sum (quite apart from the appearance of the sum itself), and the word ‘ought’ tells 
us it is an action for a debt. If the words are altered, the action is altered. If the sum 
promised by the stipulation were uncertain, the formula would not order the judge to 
condemn 18,000 ‘if Cinnamus owes 18,000’, but to condemn ‘whatever Cinnamus owes’. 
The ‘whatever’ in the intentio indicates a claim for an uncertain sum. And the altered 
formula produces a different action, the actio incerti ex stipulatu.  
Nearly every action is associated with a unique formula.
6
 This means that one usually 
describes, classifies, and analyses different actions by addressing the formulae that 
describe each action.  
5
  L’année épigraphique (1973) no. 155.  
6
  The exception is the quoted formula. See Nicholas, Introduction p. 24 n.2.  
III. The Law of Actions  
It is not easy to understand how actions could constitute a subject by themselves. Under 
the heading ‘law of actions’ one might expect to find a list of actions with a description 
of each action, in the form ‘if X injures Y in such a way, X will compensate Y to such a 
degree.’ But this sort of list would be useful only if all the law were expressed in the form 
of individual actions. That is, in a legal system such as the Institutes describe, where 
actions constitute only one subdivision of the law, we would not expect the law of actions 
to be a list of every action. In such a system there is no reason to discuss, for example, the 
depositor’s action, the ward’s action, or the vindicatory action as subjects apart from 
deposit, guardianship, or ownership. Therefore the law of actions – at least as it appears 
in the institutes of Gaius and Justinian – cannot be a list of actions, but must exist 
somehow as a subject apart from the underlying substantive rules.  
As a subject ‘actions’ never stayed the same for very long, but changed as its 
relationship with the substantive rules changed. For this reason the subject has a very 
different character in different historical periods. In the beginning, actions very possibly 
encompassed most of the law. By Justinian’s time, actions in the classical sense of 
‘claim’ were so reduced in importance that much of what appears on the subject in the 
Institutes must be read as (1) a historical description of how matters were pleaded 
centuries earlier, or (2) something like a discussion of rights, in the modern sense.  
The customary view of actions in the earliest law was expressed famously by Henry 
Maine (1822-88). He does not refer directly to Rome at the time of the Twelve Tables, 
although he seems to have had it in mind, among other examples:
7
 <215>  
The primary distinction between the early and rude, and the modern and refined, 
classifications of legal rules, is that the Rules relating to Actions, to pleading and 
procedure, fall into a subordinate place and become, as Bentham called them, Adjective 
Law. So far as this the Roman Institutional writers had advanced, since they put the Law 
of Actions into the third and last compartment of their system. Nobody should know 
better than an Englishman that this is not an arrangement which easily and spontaneously 
suggests itself to the mind. So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the 
infancy of Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually 
secreted in the interstices of procedure; and the early lawyer can only see the law through 
the envelope of its technical forms.  
7
  H.S. Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom (London, 1883) p. 389.  
Maine writes in a 19th-century style that produces memorable language, but at the 
expense of authorities and accuracy. We can nevertheless take his general point: rules in 
earlier Roman law were often expressed according to the remedial steps to be followed. 
The Twelve Tables have many examples of rules expressed in this way, e.g.,  
Table 1, 14. If he has broken the bone of a free man, let the penalty be 300. If of a slave, 150.  
Table 8, 11. Anyone who allows himself to be a witness or serve as a holder of the balances and 
then does not stand by his evidence will be untrustworthy and incompetent as a witness.  
Table 11, 2. If a slave commits theft or causes damage, [he shall be given noxally].  
Of course not all of the rules in the Twelve Tables are expressed in this way, and there are 
even good arguments to the effect that the Twelve Tables is nothing like what Maine 
describes.
8
 But to whatever extent the Twelve Tables is dominated by procedure and 
remedies, it is clear this is not an effective way to present the law. The main criticism is 
that this sort of presentation is unreflective, that it leaps immediately to the question ‘how 
much?’ without stopping long to consider ‘who is the wrongdoer?’ or ‘what is the 
wrong?’. A more reflective method of presenting laws would group similar rules together 
and consider in mass the substantive components – the ‘whos’ and the ‘whats’ – of each 
rule. This would allow a person better to classify a given set of facts as a particular kind 
of legal event. It is therefore something to be admired when, for example, jurists and 
legislators take up the events described under the first and third examples above, consider 
those events separately from any particular remedy, and then discuss them under the 
common rubric of delict. And that is Maine’s point: that with time, the underlying 
substantive ideas were more frequently discussed and expressed as subjects apart from 
litigation, thus producing a more refined method of classification.  
The law of actions is very much a function of this gradual division of <216> 
substantive law from procedure. If we imagine a system where the entire law is expressed 
in the form of actions, ‘the law of actions’ would be synonymous with ‘the law’. As the 
substantive law underlying the actions is gradually set apart for separate discussion, what 
remains behind is a residue of procedure, remedies, and as yet undisentangled substantive 
law. For lack of a better term we might call this the ‘law of actions’. How closely this 
model in fact describes the development of Roman law is a matter of debate. Some, 
notably Watson, insist that Roman law scrupulously divided substantive law from 
procedure, even as early as the Twelve Tables. Others find the model accurate, but rely 
heavily on the example of English law, where the evidence provides a better illustration 
of Maine’s statement. Plunkett, for example, in trying to account for the ‘monstrous 
distortion’ in Bracton’s De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, where actions constitute 
three-quarters of the whole treatise, resorts to the example of the Institutes: ‘As a legal 
system develops more and more matter gets transferred from the law of actions to the law 
of obligations or of things until, finally, actions are reduced to the comparatively modest 
place accorded them in [Justinian’s] Institutes’.
9
  
8
  A. Watson, ‘The Law of Actions and the Development of Substantive Law in the Early Roman 
Republic’, LQR 89 (1973) pp. 387-92. Watson generally maintains that there was a ‘strict Roman 
separation of substantive law and procedure’. A. Watson, ‘The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries’, 
Yale Law Journal 97 (1988) pp. 798, 807.  
Whatever was the true development of Roman actions, the law of actions that Gaius 
presents in the 2nd century AD is very much a ‘residuary’ division of the law in a way 
the law of persons and of things are not. The various components that make up the law of 
actions were not introduced by some superior intelligence, seeking to improve actions as 
a subdiscipline of the law. Instead, the law of actions comprises what is left over after 
centuries of picking away, of reallocation to the other divisions of the law. This means 
that actions is not a well-ordered subject, and instead of giving an integral whole with 
neat subdivisions, it frequently presents individual items of supplementary information 
that could not be fitted in elsewhere.  
Aside from omitting discussion of formulae and actions in the law, Justinian presents 
a law of actions similar to Gaius’. Yet between the time of Gaius and Justinian, the idea 
of an action underwent a great deal of change.
10
 The formulary procedure, long abolished 
by Justinian’s time, had given a certain amount of clarity to actions: a given entry on the 
praetor’s edict would correspond to a particular action, and as long as justice was pursued 
by application to the praetor for a claim from the edict, the character of individual actions 
would continue to be important. As the formulary procedure gave way to the new 
imperial procedure, however, a litigant no longer pursued a particular action, but rather 
presented facts which he believed would support a claim for relief under the law.  
9
  T.F.T. Plunkett, Early English Legal Literature (Cambridge, 1958) p. 51.  
10
  On what follows, see P. Stein, ‘The Development of the Institutional System’, in 
Stein and Lewis (eds), Studies in Memory of Thomas pp.161-3, and Birks and McLeod 
(eds), Institutes pp. 17-18.  
During the same period there was a broader change in the way actions were regarded. 
As mentioned above, in the classical law to have an action meant that a person was 
entitled to legal process. From there, however, it was only a short step to see an action as 
something that ‘attached’ to a person, a credit in his favour, as it was a debit against his 
opponent. This <217> new conception of an action became more prevalent in the 
centuries between Gaius and Justinian. If an action was a ‘credit’ to a person, and if at the 
same time that action was no longer tied to a particular remedy, then an action was very 
much like what we regard as a ‘right’.  
To the Romans this new action/right seemed to have much in common with an 
obligation – the condition of one person owing another – and not surprisingly this results 
in some confusion between obligations and actions. Both the Digest (D.44.7) and the 
Codex (C.4.10) have titles that are headed ‘On Obligations and Actions’. Also, one of the 
compilers of the Institutes, in a Greek paraphrase of the work, sought to justify 
obligations as an introduction to actions by remarking that ‘obligations are the mother of 
actions’ (Theophilus, Paraphrase 3.13). This confusion between obligations and actions 
continued into modern times. It was common even until the 18th century to regard the 
three principal divisions of the law, not as persons, things, and actions, but as persons, 
things (principally corporeal), and obligations and actions.
11
  
Although the idea of an action had altered by Justinian’s time, Justinian by and large 
presents the various classifications of actions as they appeared in the classical law. These 
classifications tell us a great deal about the law. As Gaius and Justinian present it, the law 
of actions asks us to take a step back from the specific actions themselves, to examine 
them somewhat apart from the facts under which each developed, and to describe the 
ways in which they differ from or resemble one another. Standing back from and 
analysing actions in this way results in divisions of the law quite different from the 
divisions presented under the law of persons and of things. For example, under the law of 
things we might distinguish a contract as either ‘by conduct’ or ‘by agreement’, while 
under the law of actions we might distinguished a contract as either ‘strict law’ or ‘good 
faith’. The law of actions often ignores the substantive boundaries altogether; a 
restorative action, for example, might arise under either contract or delict.  
11
  H.F. Jolowicz, ‘Obligatio and Actio’, LQR 68 (1952) pp. 469-74.  
The principal classifications are given below. It is one of the awkward things about 
the law of actions that each classification is based on a different premise. Real and 
personal actions are distinguished by the rights to be enforced. State-law and honorary 
actions are distinguished by the source of the law. Penal, restorative, and hybrid actions 
are distinguished by the object of the litigation. Each classification addresses a different 
component of the underlying law.  
IV. Real and Personal Actions (J.4.6.1 – 15, 20)  
If someone were to write a new Institutes that expressed all of the law in the language of 
actions, at the top of the hierarchy would be the division between personal (in personam) 
actions and real (in rem) actions. All <218> claims may be classified as one or the other, 
and the difference between the two types of claim is very much a matter of substantive 
law: a real action reflects a relationship between a person and property, and a personal 
action reflects a relationship between persons. The fact that a matter of substantive law is 
expressed as a difference in actions reflects the preference of the classical Romans for the 
language of remedies over the notion of rights.  
A personal action arises from debt, and a real action arises from ownership. If, for 
example, a person receives money in payment for goods, insults another person, or 
damages another person’s property, a debt arises between two people. If the matter comes 
to litigation, a claim is asserted by one person against the other. We say that the claim is 
personal, not because the litigation is between persons (it always is), but because the 
relationship being urged is one that exists between persons. Litigation over ownership, on 
the other hand, looks outwardly the same (person against person), but is based on 
something different. If a person loses possession of property that he owns and brings a 
claim to assert his ownership, this claim is in rem, because the relationship being urged is 
one that exists between a person and a thing.  
The distinction was reflected clearly in the respective formulae. Typically the intentio 
in the formula of a real action would not mention the defendant. Instead, the issue would 
be framed purely in terms of the disputed ownership: Does the property belong to the 
plaintiff by Quiritary right (ex iure Quiritium esse)? Does he own the right (ius esse) to 
the fruits? In a personal action, the intentio typically did mention the defendant, reciting 
the issue with the formal language of debt: Should the defendant give (dare oportere) 
1,000 sesterces to the plaintiff? Should the defendant do something for or give something 
to (dare facere oportere) the plaintiff on account of a prior stipulatio between them?  
Real actions existed to enforce many kinds of ownership. Aside from the familiar 
example, the claim for ownership of a thing (rei vindicatio), there were claims for the 
ownership of an inheritance (hereditatis petitio), of a usufruct (vindicatio usufructus), of 
a right to draw water (aquae ductus), and many more. Real actions also existed not to 
enforce ownership but to deny it. An owner of land who wished to deny another’s 
ownership of a usufruct or servitude might bring the appropriate ‘actio negatoria’, a real 
action. In all of these real actions it is important to remember that a plaintiff does not seek 
the return of the thing. The judge, as always, is limited to giving a remedy in money 
damages, and the description ‘real’ refers only to the underlying relationship the plaintiff 
is attempting to establish. Of course as a practical matter, where the praetor inserts a 
special provision allowing restitution at the judge’s direction, a plaintiff might have the 
thing restored, but this had nothing to do with the fact that the action was real.  
Personal actions are described in the Institutes by a clever and terse <219> piece of 
reasoning which Justinian borrows from Gaius (J.4.6.14; G.4.4): personal actions are only 
suitable for parties who deserve to get something, not for parties who own something and 
want it back; if you deserve to get it, a priori it isn’t yours. The number of personal 
actions is of course very large, and the most familiar of them are those based on contract 
or delict. Among the more familiar of the remaining actions are the action against a 
guardian for breach of duty (actio tutelae, inquiring what the defendant ‘ought to give or 
do for the plaintiff in accordance with good faith’), the action for production of a thing 
(actio ad exhibendum, inquiring whether the defendant ‘ought to produce the thing’), and 
the action to restore a dowry (actio rei uxoria, inquiring whether the defendant ‘ought to 
restore the dowry’).  
One of the consequences of dividing actions according to relationship is that, when a 
matter comes to litigation, the entire relationship, so to speak, is under review. This is 
clearest in the case of a real action. If an heir seeks to protect his inheritance by bringing 
a hereditatis petitio, the issue is whether the estate belongs to him under state law. If a 
person owns the right to channel water across certain land and his rights are interfered 
with, the issue is whether that person indeed owns the right to channel water. A person 
educated in the common law might prefer to see the issues here framed more narrowly 
(and in Roman terms, in personam), to inquire only whether someone had, for example, 
wrongfully interfered with the assets of the estate or the flow of the water. But to a 
Roman, ownership is the issue, and ownership is therefore the idea to be championed. 
The common lawyer might suggest further that it is a waste of resources to do anything 
more than try to resolve the particular issue between the parties. The Roman would 
answer that the waste lies on the other side, that his ownership is ‘true’ not only against 
one opponent but against the whole world, and he should not have to wait until everyone 
in the world sues him and loses before he can regard something as his own.  
The situation is similar for personal actions, though only actions on contracts provide 
clear examples.
12
 When a person sues on a contract, the relationship created by the 
contract is the subject of the action. The formula, after reciting the existence of the 
contract, will permit the judge to condemn the defendant ‘for whatever on that account 
the defendant ought to give to or do for the plaintiff’, or, if the matter involves a good-
faith contract, ‘for whatever on that account the defendant in good faith ought to give to 
or do for the plaintiff’. The inquiry is much broader than the particular act – for example, 
the failure to pay or to hand over the goods – that brought the parties to court in the first 
place. In other words, the basis or ‘cause’ underlying a contractual action in personam is 
the debt created by the contract, not the particular act or breach that brought about the 
dispute. This will seem unusual to a common lawyer, who is accustomed to treating the 
breach of a contract, not the contract itself, as the basis of a lawsuit. And the 
consequences of the Roman treatment are severe; <220> unless a party protects himself 
by careful pleading, his right to sue on the same contract in the future will be consumed 
when issue is joined, in the same way the right of his common-law counterpart to sue on 
the same breach is consumed.  
V. State-Law and Honorary Actions (J.4.6.3 – 13)   
The distinction between state-law and honorary actions is based on the source from 
which the claim is derived. In a system in which a magistrate has an independent power 
to create new claims, claims created within that power come to be distinguished from 
claims that are not so created. Claims based upon the state law and unaltered by the 
magistrates’ intervention are called ‘state-law actions’. The ‘state law’ in this context 
means the Twelve Tables and other legislation (including interpretations of those 
statutes), together with the rules developed by juristic practice. Claims of the magistrates’ 
creation are called honorary actions, and comprise actions in which the magistrate has 
exercised some degree of innovation, either by altering an existing state-law action (as in 
the Publician action) or in creating an entirely new action, not recognised as part of the 
state law (as in the actio de dolo). In Papinian’s phrase, the honorary law acts ‘to aid, 
supplement, or correct the state law, in the public interest’ (D.1.1.7.1). ‘Honorary’ is an 
adjective that means ‘pertaining to the office of a magistrate’; it includes the office of 
both the praetor and aedile.  
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10.  
A magistrate was called upon to innovate when an action under the state law did not 
speak to a particular problem or would not produce a satisfactory result, and his 
innovations took several forms. A common form was the ‘fictitious formula’, a formula 
that directed the judge to accept as true something that was not. The most familiar 
example is the Publician action: a person who had lost possession of property and was 
not an owner under state law might be permitted to bring what amounted to an owner’s 
vindicatory action. It was a vindicatory action in all respects, except that it asked the 
judge to assume as true the falsehood that the plaintiff had satisfied the time limits of 
usucapion. (The Publician action was available both to bonitary owners and bona fide 
possessors, though by Justinian’s time bonitary ownership did not exist, and hence he 
speaks only of bona fide possessors at J.4.6.4.). Fictitious formulae were also used to 
good effect in lawsuits over inheritance. The state-law rules for intestate succession 
operated narrowly in favour of agnates, and as a result an emancipated child, for 
example, would not take a share of his parent’s estate as heir, as one might expect. The 
praetor, however, innovated aggressively in this area, and in supplementing the state-law 
scheme by the institution of bonorum possessio, allowed the emancipated child to take 
the estate ‘as if an heir’ (G.4.34; see Chapter 4, section II(c) above). Fictions such as 
these allowed the praetor to be innovative without disturbing the law too much: <221>  
Roman fictions are common in two contexts, in pleadings and in legislation. Their 
function is the same in both, namely to extend a parcel of knowledge which is fixed and 
safe: we know exactly what happens when X is the case; now that Y is the case, we will 
proceed in exactly the same way, ‘as if the case were X’. This is economical, cautious, 
and rigorous.
13
  
A second way in which a magistrate innovated was by granting actions on the case. 
This type of innovation, as in the fictitious actions just described, was distinguished by a 
characteristic formula. But unlike a fictitious action, an action on the case might be 
highly creative and far-reaching.  
In a state-law action, the formula was ordinarily in ius concepta (‘conceived on the 
basis of the state law’). In practice this meant that the intentio of the formula was framed 
so as to recite a set of circumstances recognised in the state law. The formula in such an 
action would contain certain legally charged words, such as ‘duty’ (oportere), ‘belong’ 
(rem suam esse), ‘sell’ (vendere). In the buyer’s action, for example, the intentio would 
inquire ‘whereas the plaintiff bought from the defendant a thing which is the subject of 
this action …’. This recites the essence of a sale under state law, that the plaintiff bought 
a thing. A second example is the action for non-manifest theft. Here the intentio would 
inquire ‘if it appears that the theft of the thing was carried out by the defendant, for which 
act the defendant ought to pay a penalty as thief …’. This language follows the offence of 
non-manifest theft as recited in the Twelve Tables.  
In an action on the case, however, the intentio was drafted ‘on the facts’. This meant 
that the intentio would simply recite certain factual allegations, and would direct the 
judge to condemn if he found those allegations to be true. In such a case the judge was 
saved the trouble of investigating whether the plaintiff’s claim was made out under the 
rules of the state law. So, for example, the formula in an action for fraud recited certain 
hypothetical facts, such as ‘if it appears that the plaintiff [has suffered some harm] by the 
fraud of the defendant …’ If the judge found these facts to be true, he would condemn the 
defendant.  
We can see the value in this method of innovation by considering a particular action 
on the case, the actio de recepto.
14
 If a shipmaster, innkeeper, or stablekeeper undertook 
to keep a person’s property safe, and then did not restore the property, the praetor would 
grant an action against him. (See Ulpian, D.4.9.1 pr, and Chapter 5, section VI above) It 
is surprising at first that the praetor saw fit to create this action, because there was no 
shortage of other actions available. An undertaking to keep something safe might 
constitute a locatio conductio operis if undertaken for pay, or depositum if not, and each 
might provide a remedy if the thing were not returned. Also, if the property were stolen 
or damaged, an action for theft (Ulpian, D.47.5) or damage (Paul, D.4.9.6) might be 
available against the keeper, even if the act were committed by an employee of the <222> 
keeper. Yet the actio de recepto is a useful addition: where the loss was not a result of 
theft or damage, or the fault was not of a degree (dolus) to allow an actio depositi, a 
general-purpose action holding the keeper to his undertaking was desirable. It may have 
required a degree of accountability of the keeper that was simply not available under any 
other action (though whether this was true of locatio conductio is uncertain), and had the 
further advantage that it imposed an unforgiving standard of conduct on professions that 
were not held in high regard.  
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Essays for Tony Honoré (Oxford, 1986) p. 95.  
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Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford, 1996) pp. 514-20.  
Actions on the case were particularly useful in two areas of the law. First, they were 
of enormous importance under the Aquilian Act. Under the statute itself the requirement 
of causation was fairly narrow, restricted essentially to harm that was caused directly. 
The introduction of actions on the case allowed an aggrieved person to have a remedy 
even when the harm was caused indirectly. Second, a certain class of contractual actions 
on the case existed, called ‘actions with a special preface’ (actiones praescriptis verbis). 
These were praetorian extensions of the state-law actions on obligations contracted by 
conduct, and through these actions the praetor could recognise the existence of 
transactions that did not fit within one of the traditional categories of contract. 
Technically (and somewhat confusingly) these extensions were regarded as state-law 
actions themselves, as each was modelled closely on the contract it resembled. But the 
formulae were drafted as actions on the case: a demonstratio was added at the beginning 
(hence ‘special preface’), reciting the underlying facts of the transaction.
15
   
Where a state-law action and an action on the case existed for the same underlying 
institution (as for the Aquilian Act), it was not always true that the action on the case was 
an innovation upon the state-law action. The difference, again, lay in the way the 
formulae were drafted, and we can take the example of the action for deposit. We know 
that, early on, the Twelve Tables allowed a penal action against a depositee under certain 
(unknown) circumstances. At some time during the early Republic the praetor recognised 
a new action on the case, the actio depositi in factum. As Gaius describes it (G.4.47), the 
action looked something like this:  
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  Zimmermann, above note 14, pp. 532-5.  
If it appears that the plaintiff deposited a thing with the defendant and 
through the fraud of the defendant it has not been restored to the plaintiff, 
condemn the defendant to pay the plaintiff whatever the thing is worth.  
In creating this action the praetor probably recognised that the remedy under the Twelve 
Tables left something to be desired. Perhaps the Twelve Tables remedy was allowed only 
under narrow circumstances, or there was a need, apart from the existing penal remedy, 
for a new remedy allowing a depositor simply to recover the value of his property.
16
 In 
any event, this action, with its formula drafted ‘on the facts’, was the result of praetorian 
innovation. In time the contract of deposit, with the help of juristic interpretation, came to 
be included among the so-called obligations con- <223> tracted by conduct and gave rise 
to an obligation under state law. And as with the other contracts in this category (except 
mutuum), a depositor might pursue a broadly grounded ‘good faith’ state-law action. This 
action, as again Gaius describes it (G.4.47), looked something like this:  
Whereas the plaintiff deposited a thing with the defendant, whatever on that account the 
defendant ought to give to or do for the plaintiff in good faith, condemn the defendant.  
The state-law action for deposit was therefore a later creation than the action for deposit 
on the case.  
Because both state-law and honorary actions were administered by the same person, it 
is often difficult to draw a line between them. Schulz
17
 mentions the example of the 
vindicatory action: nothing would seem to belong more to the state law than an action 
which states ‘condemn the defendant if it appears that the disputed thing belongs to the 
plaintiff by Quiritary right.’ And yet the additional clause added by the praetor – ‘unless 
the thing is restored to the plaintiff according to [the judge’s] direction’ – utterly 
transforms the action. The praetor was called upon to innovate here because, without his 
intervention, the judge would be permitted to condemn only in money damages, and this 
could not be a satisfactory remedy in every case. But in allowing restitution at the judge’s 
direction (arbitrium), the resulting ‘discretionary action’ becomes difficult to classify 
firmly as either state-law or honorary.  
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et Documenta Historiae et Iuris 52 (1986) pp. 105-60 .  
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A comparison between a Roman magistrate’s power to innovate and the historical 
equity jurisdiction of the English Chancellor is unavoidable. In many respects the 
distinction between the state law and the honorary law resembles that between the 
common law and equity in England. But there is less to this resemblance than first 
appears. The Roman magistrate presided over both types of action and therefore, as 
Buckland
18
 says, ‘We shall not find in the Roman law a system of rules developed 
gradually by a permanent tribunal whose function it was to give relief which for any 
reason could not be obtained in the ordinary courts’. Also, when we consider that some of 
the innovations introduced by the praetor out of a desire for equity would then be 
memorialised in his edict for future cases, the praetor resembles more a legislator than a 
chancellor. Finally, it is a fair argument that the greater source of equity in Roman law is 
not the praetor but the jurists, whose innovations would be felt principally in the second, 
trial phase of a lawsuit.
19
  
VI. Restorative, Penal, and Hybrid Actions (J.4.6.16 – 19; 4.12.1)  
This classification is based on the object of the litigation. As the Institutes explains, some 
actions are directed to providing compensation, some to <224> inflicting a penalty, and 
some to both of these things. A cynical reader may come to the conclusion that there is 
too much classification here. The aim of the discussion, in the end, seems to be to 
identify the minority of actions that are either wholly or partly penal, and to indicate the 
consequences of bringing such actions.  
A restorative action is one which would give to the plaintiff an award that does not 
exceed his loss. This may seem like a roundabout way of describing something fairly 
simple, but in fact the definition must be put carefully. The Institutes gives the example 
of an action for the death of a slave under the Aquilian Act (J.4.6.19). Under the action 
the slave, in a given case, might be valued higher than his worth at death, and the 
difference between the two values would be regarded as penal. We might treat this as a 
question of valuation and view the owner of the slave as overcompensated rather than 
avenged, but that is not how the matter is treated in the Institutes. Perhaps what this 
discussion best illustrates is that restorative actions are defined by what they are not 
(neither penal nor hybrid), and that time is better spent identifying actions that are wholly 
or partly penal. Most actions, after all, are restorative. In general, real actions and 
contractual actions fall into this class, leaving delictual actions as penal or hybrid.  
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  W.W. Buckland, Equity in Roman Law (London, 1911) p. 1.  
19
  Id. pp. 1-8.  
A penal action typically will (1) exact a sum greater than the amount of the loss, as 
just described, or (2) exact a multiple of the loss. The fact that they were viewed as 
inflicting a penalty led to certain other features. The first concerns the matter of 
transmissibility. The issue arises when a person who might have become a plaintiff or 
defendant dies before issue is joined. In such a case an heir might be permitted to bring 
the action the decedent would have brought, or be vulnerable to the action that would 
have been brought against the decedent. If the action is one that permits an heir to assert 
the decedent’s claim, it is said to be actively transmissible. If it is one that permits an heir 
to have a claim asserted against him, it is said to be passively transmissible. The general 
rule was that restorative actions were both actively and passively transmissible, but that 
penal actions were only actively transmissible. The rule of course reflects the idea that 
only the wrongdoer himself should be punished. An exception was made for contempt: it 
was neither passively nor actively transmissible, in keeping with the notion that the 
outrage suffered by the victim of contempt belongs to him alone.  
The second feature was that, if more than one person were liable under such an 
action, both were liable in full, so that satisfaction by one did not release the others. If for 
example two persons had committed a non-manifest theft, each was liable for the double 
penalty. The rationale is the converse of that for the previous rule: just as it makes no 
sense to punish someone who did not commit the act, it makes no sense to spare someone 
who did. <225>  
The third feature is that a penal action permitted noxal surrender. This is discussed 
below.  
The Institutes glosses over what is actually at issue here, and presents the distinction 
between penal and restorative actions (almost) as a purely academic matter of 
classification. The real issue is bar. In general a person was not permitted to pursue two 
actions on the same matter. As soon as a dispute had passed the point at which issue was 
joined (the conclusion of the proceedings before the magistrate), a litigant could not raise 
the matter again. But this rule held true only for multiple restorative actions, or multiple 
penal actions. A person was permitted to bring both a restorative action and a penal 
action on the same matter, and hence the importance of identifying which actions were 
penal, wholly or in part. For example, a victim of theft could bring both an actio furti 
(penal) to punish the thief and a rei vindicatio (restorative) to the get the thing back, but 
not a rei vindicatio and a condictio furtiva (restorative).  
Given the bar of multiple actions, it was particularly important to identify which 
actions were ‘hybrid’, that is, both restorative and penal.
20
 A hybrid action would bar any 
further suit, of either type, on the same matter. One particular hybrid action both 
illustrates the usefulness of the classification ‘hybrid’ and betrays the true purpose of the 
restorative/penal/hybrid classification. The Institutes gives the action on robbery as an 
example of a hybrid action (J.4.6.19). It is a hybrid action because, of the fourfold penalty 
inflicted on the defendant, only three parts are considered to be a penalty. Centuries 
earlier Gaius had discussed the same subject, but unlike Justinian omitted robbery from 
his examples of actions ‘both restorative and penal’ (the term ‘hybrid’ not then existing). 
Instead, he included robbery among the purely penal actions, explaining that ‘in the 
opinion of some’ that is where it belonged (G.4.8). To say ‘in the opinion of some’ is 
tantamount to saying that in the opinion of others the action on robbery ought to be 
classed as both penal and restorative (it being beyond argument that anyone would class 
it as restorative alone).  
Yet the dispute over how the action on robbery ought to be classified had nothing to 
do with classifications per se. The true issue was probably whether a robber could be 
treated as a ‘thief’ and sued by the condictio furtiva, a restorative action one brought 
against thieves. If a robber were a thief, the condictio furtiva would be available unless 
the action on robbery were deemed to be restorative in part, in which event it would bar 
any further restorative action. In short, what is presented as a scholarly disagreement over 
classifications is in fact an argument over bar, something genuinely significant to a 
litigant. <226>  
VII. Other Classifications (J.4.6.28 – 30; 4.8)  
There are other classifications of actions which, unlike the classifications just given, are 
relevant only within certain areas of the law. That they are treated under the law of 
actions and not in the appropriate places under persons or things may be explained by a 
desire to avoid repetition, or the fact that they present characteristic formulae which make 
them attractive to discuss as actions.  
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The most important of these other classifications pertains to certain personal actions. 
These actions were classed as to whether they were ‘good-faith’ or ‘strict-law’ (J.4.6.28 – 
30). Superficially the difference was one of pleading, but the actions reflected a 
difference in substantive law as well. A strict-law action was characterised not by what it 
said but by what it did not say: the judge who presided in such an action could not 
consider any matters that were not a part of the pleadings, that is, the formula. If, for 
example, a defendant in a suit on a stipulation wished to argue that he was induced to 
give the stipulation by fraud or duress, or that his opponent had agreed not to pursue him, 
he would have to plead the matter expressly. The formula directed the judge very plainly 
to condemn the defendant if it appeared that the defendant ought to give a sum to the 
plaintiff. Accordingly, in the absence of special pleading, the judge would confine 
himself to examining the integrity of the stipulation. In a good-faith action, however, the 
judge was given far wider discretion to consider other defences, and this grant of 
discretion was an integral part of the formula. A formula in a good-faith action directed 
the judge to inquire what the defendant ought to give or do for the plaintiff in accordance 
with good faith. The addition of the words ‘in accordance with good faith’ (ex bona fide) 
distinguishes a good-faith action. The consequence of this addition is that a judge 
presiding, for example, in an action on sale, may absolve on his own motion a defendant 
who he believes was a victim of fraud when he agreed to purchase goods: such a 
defendant should not in good faith pay the purchase price.  
Certain specific actions were set apart and classed as good-faith actions. The most 
important of these were actions on obligations contracted by agreement, and those 
contracted by conduct, with the exception of mutuum.  
What Justinian describes as ‘noxal actions’ (J.4.8) might be more fully described as 
‘actions that allow noxal surrender as a remedy’. The remedy arises in the context of 
delict, and resembles a ‘delictual mechanic’s lien’. A person sometimes becomes liable 
for a delict committed by someone else, either a slave or a person within his family 
authority. If the delict is one that allows noxal surrender, the person liable is permitted 
either to pay damages or surrender the wrongdoer to the victim. By Justinian’s time noxal 
surrender applied only to slaves, and not to children within authority. <227>  
The common explanation for the origins of noxal surrender is that liability for delict 
is based on revenge, and that the victim’s right to avenge his loss by seizing the 
wrongdoer could be forgone by the payment of a ransom. Whether this is the correct 
explanation or not, it is consistent with certain features of the remedy. In the case of a 
slave, the person held liable is the person who owned the slave at the time of the action. 
The owner at the time of the delict is free from liability when he ceases to own the slave. 
Thus the aim of the action is simply to satisfy the victim, consistent with the notion of 
revenge. The same notion is apparent in the additional rule that a person may not have a 
noxal action against a slave that he owns.  
The Institutes (borrowing from Gaius, G.4.75) justifies noxal surrender very poorly, 
arguing that it is unfair for a slave to inflict a loss on his owner beyond his own value 
(J.4.8.2). The statement is not convincing as a piece of legal analysis, and even less as a 
historical explanation. As Holmes points out, noxal surrender was not introduced as a 
vehicle for limitation of liability. His analysis is charitable: ‘The Roman lawyers, not 
looking beyond their own system or their own time, drew on their wits for an explanation 
which would show that the law as they found it was reasonable’.
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